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Within language, through language, beyond language: the portmanteau-word neologism as
agent and emblem of contingent change.
Nicholas Webber
Through developing a theorisation of the portmanteau-word neologism as an agent
and emblem of contingent change, this essay will seek to unpack the complex, liminal
dynamics which underpin moments of creativity and frame-stretching difference. Operating
on the border between repulsion and attraction, agency and structure, the portmanteau-word
enacts (as well as provides a model for) the emergence of difference from both within and
beyond structured planes, and through doing so, works to illuminate, through reflection, the
potential for creative or subversive flux within those structures which it itself (contingently)
exceeds. As a signifier more able to flaunt the creative and germinative potential inherent in
all language, the portmanteau-word represents a sort of hyperlanguage which
synecdochically impacts upon its more contained and circumspect sibling. Any term can
become subject to processes of (re)articulation which extend the scopes and scapes of
meaning (as demonstrated through a brief foray into the lexicographical history of the
signifier “portmanteau” in the first section of this essay), but it is the portmanteau-word
which in effect squares this difference by insisting that signification never rests, that all
structures are porous, and that any claim of control is internally contradicted. In order to
explicate these claims a short case-study of Sarah Palin’s coinage “refudiate” will be
undertaken, with a view to expounding the neologism’s liminal lexicographical position and
unstable signification. And further textual examples will be considered by way of Francis
Huxley’s peculiar work of Carrollian criticism The Raven and the Writing Desk (1976) and
James Joyce’s pioneering “portmanteau” text Finnegans Wake (1939), both of which
contingently exceed (and thereby comment upon) given structures and forms through
assuming a position within, through and beyond the realm of literary criticism and the novel
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respectively. The theoretical implications of this dynamic will be discussed with reference to
Michel de Certeau’s conception of tactical agency in The Practice of Everyday Life (1984),
and, less explicitly though no less influentially, Ernesto Laclau’s Derridean influenced
theorisation of the “decision taken in an undecidable terrain” (283), both of which articulate
the reorganising impact of the fragment on the whole, the individual on hegemony, and in so
doing portray worlds where “nothing is definitely acquired and there is always the possibility
of challenge” (Laclau 292). It is the argument of the following essay that the portmanteauword too, through its frame-stretching dynamic and brash indeterminacy, both enacts and
embodies this proclamation.

~ Portmanteaux ~
From its early lexicographical life in 1656 in Thomas Blount’s Glossographia, where
it is defined as “a Cloakbag or Male” (244), through to its current 2,500-word OED-online
entry (including the noun and verb form of the signifier), the term “portmanteau” ably
demonstrates the accumulative nature of meaning attribution. Alongside Blount, the
seventeenth-century “hard word” dictionaries of Edward Philips, Elisha Coles and William
Bullokar define the term, with only slight deviations, as a cloak-bag or male (male being
defined as metal armour made of rings, i.e. chainmail). Nathan Bailey’s Dictionarium
Britannicum (1736) also defines portmanteau as “a cloak bag to carry necessities for a
journey”, but adds a supplementary meaning (dropping “male” in the process) of “a piece of
work fastened to a wall in a wardrobe, armoury, etc., proper for hanging cloaks”. The first
edition of Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary in 1755 whittles the definition back to “a chest or
bag in which cloaths are carried”. With the first edition of the OED in 1909 <1> this
(relatively) stable constellation of meanings splits off into: 1) object—a case or bag for
carrying clothes; 2) person—an officer of the king of France (usually tasked with carrying his
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cloak); 3) object—a clothes-rack to peg clothes on; and 4) concept—the sense in which
things are packed together (1146). The 1989 second edition offers a similar range of
definitions (only with more explanatory information and examples) but also includes
additional categories for 5) language—a general description or category, or a word which has
a general or generalized meaning; and 6) linguistics—a portmanteau morph (a morph which
represents two morphemes simultaneously). The second edition also includes for the first
time the verb form of the signifier, i.e. “to portmanteau”, as well as the rather grand sounding
“portmantologism” which is defined as the study of portmanteau-words (157). The latest
online edition of the OED (2011) largely mirrors the 1989 version, although a separate
section is given over to the portmanteau-word itself, as distinct from the more general,
conceptual definition of “that into which things are packed together”.
Of course Raymond Williams has already shown how similar patterns of deviation
can be demonstrated with much “weightier” signifiers than portmanteau. And the huge
increase in definitional paraphernalia—from Blount’s fifteen-word definition in 1656 to the
OED’s 2,500-word containment effort in 2011—can largely be attributed to technological
advances in lexicographical, etymological and philological research. Yet the persistent
slippage of the (persistently slippery) signifier from “official” signification to “folk”
signification should not be downplayed in light of these somewhat obvious qualifications.
Just as the movement in the other direction, where the official (re)inscribes the folk—where it
works to take up the slack, (re)impose order, (re)stamp authority—remains worthy of close
attention. Both gestures spring from the plasticity of language—what Kenneth Burke terms
the “rhetoric of substance”—that acausal quality inhered in all signifiers which invites (or
rather demands) control with one hand and slaps it away with the other (Grammar 52). All
signifiers are subject to this waltzing, rise-and-fall movement of de- and re-signification,
control and excess, excess and control, and with each spin and spiral of (re)articulation, as
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meaning expands and contracts in the currents of the dance, the frame of language stretches
to assimilate the vagaries of experience.
Compact as a seed, then, the signifier portmanteau, like all signifiers, contains within
it the germ of new direction. Whether it be Thomas Blount’s “portmanteau” in 1656, or
Lewis Carroll’s “portmanteau” in 1871, we will always discover the same germinative
potential, that same sense of moving beyond the frame. There is no mention of “portmanteau
biota” in the latest OED, just as “portmanteau drugs” and “portmanteau cinema” are excluded
from the text <2>. Such (re)articulations always bear a supplemental relation to the official
record of signification: what is inside and what is outside is never a settled matter; life goes
on.

~ The Palinian portmanteau-word ~
In apprehending the portmanteau-word (rather than portmanteau-as-word) we find
that this insinuated supplemental relation to language and signification not only returns, but
in fact comes to represent a critical theoretical mechanism for what we might now term
(hesitatingly, ruefully and for one time only) “portmantologists”. More than simply
(re)articulate a word through processes of de- and re-signification—altering, as it were, the
stuff under the bonnet of language—the portmanteau-word neologism marks an irruption of
novelty on the very surface of discourse. Morphemes and phonemes are shunted about,
switched around, refused and re-fused into new configurations which exist beyond (despite
coming from within) the frame language.
To offer a useful (if somewhat pedestrian) example of this, we need go back only to
2010 and Sarah Palin’s coining of the portmanteau-word “refudiate”—which can be read as a
combination of “refuse”, “refute” and “repudiate”. Palin first used the term during an
interview on The Sean Hannity Show, where, commenting on accusations made against the
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Tea Party movement, she remarked: “the President and his wife, er, ya know, the First Lady,
spoke at NAACP so recently … they have power in their words. They could refudiate what it
is this group is saying and they could set the record straight” (Scarceclips). This passed
without comment until the term appeared again, just two weeks later, on Palin’s Twitter feed,
where she wrote, this time about the proposed building of a mosque near Ground Zero in
New York: “doesn’t it stab you in the heart, as it does ours throughout the heartland?
Peaceful Muslims, pls refudiate” (Johnson). The text was quickly deleted once the error was
spotted and the following text appeared in its stead: “Peaceful New Yorkers, pls refute <3>
the Ground Zero mosque plan if you believe catastrophic pain caused @ Twin Towers site is
too raw, too real”. A third tweet then appeared which made reference to the now-deleted
initial tweet which sparked the whole controversy in the first place: “‘Refudiate,’
‘misunderestimate,’ ‘wee-wee’d up.’ English is a living language. Shakespeare liked to coin
new words too. Got to celebrate it!” (Weaver) The other two examples given in this quote are
from George W. Bush (“misunderestimate”) and Barack Obama (“wee-wee’d up”), and serve
presumably—along with William Shakespeare—to justify or reason away her now celebrated
(albeit deleted) creative use of the English language. Palin then made further comment
concerning this incident during her reality television programme Sarah Palin’s Alaska, where
she said:

yesterday I twittered the word refudiate instead of repudiate … I pressed an eff instead of a dee <4>
and people freak out … so now we’re saying no no no no no … the, er, English language is a
moving, breathing, evolving art. I can invent a word. So now guess what … refudiate is now the
number two search term on Google trends … make lemonade out of lemons. (TheYoungTurks)

In a final befitting twist to the story the sheer quantity of usage “refudiate” attracted
(mockingly or otherwise) in the weeks following these public comments led the editors of the
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New Oxford American Dictionary to declare it “Word of the Year” for 2010, arguing on the
OUPblog that “[f]rom a strictly lexical interpretation of the different contexts in which Palin
has used ‘refudiate,’ we have concluded that neither ‘refute’ nor ‘repudiate’ seems
consistently precise, and that ‘refudiate’ more or less stands on its own, suggesting a general
sense of ‘reject.’” This is not to say, however, that “refudiate” will appear in any forthcoming
Oxford English Dictionary: its usage is not yet widespread enough to warrant this action.
Both word (of the Year), then, and unauthorised signifier, “refudiate” exists in some
sort of lexicographical purgatory, a linguistic limbo in which its situated (and recognized)
contextual meaning confers little authority; it is at once defined and floating, controlled and
wayward—a sort of (non)word which exhibits plenitude and absence simultaneously. And
Palin’s reaction to the term reveals a similar dynamic. In initially deleting the offending
signifier Palin presumably thought it something to be ashamed of, a corrigendum to be struck
from the record, yet her subsequent celebration of the (now Shakespearean) term confers on
its absence an unerring presence. Through Palin’s ambivalence “refudiate” moves from the
realm of error into eulogy and from abnormality into commonality (it is just the way in which
English as a “moving, breathing, evolving, art” functions), and in so doing calls into question
the very distinctions (of acceptance/refusal, inclusion/exclusion, etc.) that we are forced to
make regarding “proper English”. This portmanteau-word neologism is a freak of language,
an aberrant collection of graphemes, and is therefore worthy of exclusion, yet it is also a
contextually situated signifier, a word with a place, and in fact operates (and comes into
being) as all words do, through recombination and re-fusing.
None of this is to sidestep the obvious external pressures which drew out such
ambiguity in the first place though. Evidently were it not for Palin’s television appearance on
The Sean Hannity Show (coupled with the fact that nothing can ever be entirely erased from
the palimpsestic surface of the internet), such opportunistic flip-flopping may never even
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have come about, and “refudiate” might have disappeared down an Orwellian memory-hole
never to return. But such caveats should not distract from the ambivalent and uneasy position
which “refudiate” comes to assume, both in the rhetoric of the ever-politicking Palin and the
lexicographical boundaries of the English language, since it is this same supplemental,
inside/outside, (non)word (non)locus which recurs across many discussions of the
portmanteau-word in both literature and theory. Palin’s assertion that “refudiate” emerged as
a result of an English language ever in flux chimes with Derek Attridge’s argument that (in
his case, Jocyean) portmanteau-words, “far from being a sport, an eccentricity, a mistake”, in
fact reveal “the processes upon which all language relies” (Attridge 198)—that is, they both
emerge and signify through the recombination of contextually situated morphemes. Ruben
Borg draws on a similarly supplemental relation when he speaks of (again, Joycean)
portmanteau-words as “partial objects” which “refuse to be contained within the Wake’s
structural design at the same time as they constitute a fundamental part of it” (Measureless
Time 69). And Nicholas Royle’s uncanny depiction of the portmanteau-word as “the
troublingly strange or strangely familiar” (238) works too to depict such neologisms (this
time Carrollian) as somehow both within and beyond comprehension.
Even within the “strictly lexical” definition of “refudiate” itself we find homologous
uncertainty. The Oxford American Dictionary’s definition—“that neither ‘refute’ nor
‘repudiate’ seems consistently precise, and that ‘refudiate’ more or less stands on its own,
suggesting a general sense of ‘reject’”—can only operate on the level of hypothesis; such a
definition offers, as it states, a “general sense” based on suggestion, assumption and
conjecture. It is a story written retroactively in the nonsignifying space of the coined word
and requires interpretive license to come into being. It would be more than possible, for
example, to re-enter this space armed with two new progenitors and emerge with a different
sense of the word. Rather than “refute” and “repudiate” we could offer, say, “refuse” and
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“remediate” (or, more simply, “mediate”), still keeping the original contextual usage intact
whilst significantly altering its “general sense”. Through this reinterpretation “refudiate”
shifts to a more conciliatory form of refusal or rejection; rather than outright dismissal,
complex issues are treated with a modicum of sensitivity, even if the final result remains the
same. Other more complex deconstructions, involving numerous progenitors, are of course
possible. But the point is that any such (re)interpretations belatedly occur in their own
contextualising space and time, and can thus continually elicit new avenues of
comprehension based on these shifting axes. As Umberto Eco writes of the Wakean
portmanteau: “one is compelled to find an order and, at the same time, to realize that there are
many possible orders; a given choice does not eliminate the alternatives.” (66)

~ The Carrollian portmanteau-word ~
In Humpty Dumpty’s autocratic approach to signification in Through the LookingGlass (1871), where he assumes the role of “Master of Meaning”, any sense of these
multivalent interpretive pathways falls under monologic rule (or appears to, at any rate).
Humpty Dumpty, as he is proud to state, can make words mean whatever he wants them to
mean, and a number of nonce-neologisms (all from the poem “Jabberwocky”) present this
case ably, with “rath” defined as “a sort of green pig”, “borogove” as “a thin shabby-looking
bird” and “toves” as a cross between badgers, lizards and corkscrews (Gardner 226-7). In
addition to these nonce-neologisms, shades of new meaning are also attached to existing
signifiers, with the term “impenetrability” (roughly) accumulating the meaning “time to
move on”; the word “glory” coming to entail “a nice knock-down argument” (Gardner 225);
and perhaps most notably for this discussion, the word “portmanteau” coming to signify, as
the 1909 OED has it, “the sense in which things are packed together”. The famous quotation
which enacts this final transformation comes in Humpty Dumpty’s definition of the
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neologism “slithy”, which runs: “[w]ell, ‘slithy’ means ‘lithe and slimy.’ ‘Lithe’ is the same
as ‘active.’ You see it’s like a portmanteau—there are two meanings packed up into one
word.” (Gardner 225)
Yet despite his protestations to the contrary, Humpty Dumpty’s (self-ordained)
position as “Master of Meaning” is necessarily untenable, since through emphasising the
inherently arbitrary nature of meaning attribution he undercuts his own authority at every
turn. In a manner similar to Locke’s “blank slate” philosophy of language, Humpty Dumpty’s
private conception of the word-idea dyad actually relies upon shared and codified
signification in order to actuate itself in the world. (As Cixous remarks in the introduction to
the French translation of the text: “his claims are only of value in the world of meaning”
(235)). Any notion of “mastery” thus grows contingent on the presence of an other (bearing
these shared codes) who operates both as an arbiter—that is, as a master of the master of
meaning—and as a subject equally liable to assert their own authority (however relative and
contingent) over processes of signification. The same is true of his derivation of the
portmanteau-word “slithy”, which, not being a nonce-neologism like “rath” or “borogove”,
must use existing frameworks of meaning (i.e. the acknowledged meaning of “lithe” and
“slimy”) to come into existence. To borrow an image from the nursery-rhyme in which he
also stars, it is as if Humpty Dumpty both sits atop the wall (of signification) and lies in yolky
pieces at its base. If it is a question only of “which is to be master”—language or the
subject—then the answer is far more complicated than Humpty Dumpty is willing to admit,
since to take command of language is only to acknowledge complicity and contingency with
language—which being made, by the subject, to stretch through itself beyond itself, marks
out the very (shaky) ground on which the subject then begins to stake a claim of ascendency.
To borrow some terminology from Ernesto Laclau, all moves made in the “undecidable
terrain” of semantic (or structural) ambiguity are instances of hegemonic decision-making
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which through their very possibility are rendered impossible (283). Humpty Dumpty is forced
to rely on the inherent slipperiness of language to get a good grip of it, and it is from this
paradoxical position that the possibility of deconstructing hegemony (in whatever form)
remains evergreen.
Through making plain, then, that signification is never a settled matter, or, rather, that
it only becomes settled (chimerically) through an act of interpretive force which is in itself
contingent, partial and ill-fitting, the logic of the portmanteau-word rebounds into both wider
language and acts of reading and writing. Since in stretching the frame of language to
accommodate new perspectives, the portmanteau-word opens up and presents a space of
semantic ambiguity which is in fact present in all signifiers to greater or lesser degrees. And
just as it is possible to enter into the nonsignifying space of the portmanteau-word and seize
control (however contingently), so it is possible also to enter into any text or any signifier to
test limits and flexibility—to “poach”, as Michel de Certeau puts it in The Practice of
Everyday Life, new and “unauthorised” signification from the hunting grounds of institutional
meaning or authorial intent (174).
As Humpty Dumpty shows, however, such licence cannot be unbounded if it seeks
eventually to enter into or manipulate existing codes of sense—everyone requires a figurative
Alice to arbitrate over innovation; the frame can only stretch so far. And indeed the same can
be said of de Certeau’s agency giving project in Practice more generally, where the inherited
grids of control (Foucauldian in nature) are not dispensed with altogether, but tweaked and
tested to exhibit how and where such systems fail their hegemonic goal, and where aspects of
the individual intercept the grand narratives of law, history and science. What this then
creates in terms of textual meaning is not the eradication of top-down, institutionally
authorised readings of texts, but rather the arrival of a bottom-up conception of meaning
production within the top-down framework—as de Certeau writes, “readers are travellers;
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they move across lands belonging to someone else, like nomads poaching their way across
fields they did not write, despoiling the wealth of Egypt to enjoy it themselves” (174). Egypt
has not been overthrown; the reader must still trespass on the land of others. All that has been
exposed is a fraying edge, a few loose stitches in the fabric of power, where incremental
change might work to inhibit, through (re)articulation, testing and stretching, the structural
dominance which overdetermines daily life.
It is, then, between the impulses of repulsion (from the group, threatening isolation)
and attraction (to the group, threatening assimilation) that every act of staking out difference,
creativity, subversion, etc., must operate. A good example of this can be found in Francis
Huxley’s little-known and peculiar work of Carrollian criticism, The Raven and the Writing
Desk (1976), where a seemingly unhinged critical approach to Carroll’s life and works
manages to both reflect upon and disrupt traditional critical practice through simultaneously
appearing both within and against its categories and form. John Cage’s “silent” composition
“4’ 33”” operates in a similar manner in terms of what constitutes music, just as, say,
Kasimir Malevich’s “Black Square” upsets the category of art from within the category of art,
and James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake undercuts the form and tradition of the novel in
novelistic form. Interestingly the comparison here between Raven and the Wake is not a new
one. In one of the very few reviews Huxley’s text attracted, James Kincaid writes of what he
terms a “brilliant, tiresome, witty, self-indulgent book” (273) that “[p]erhaps it is just
ignorance or unfamiliarity that makes one resist a book of criticism that recalls Finnegans
Wake more vividly than it does ‘The Concept of Plot and the Plot of Tom Jones’” (274).
Huxley’s text is so much not like traditional criticism that for Kincaid it ceases to be such,
and his review reads largely as a rejection of the work as a serious piece of scholarly
endeavour. To put it in the terms introduced above, the impulse of repulsion in Raven is for
the reviewer strong enough to isolate it from other works of criticism more characterised by
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assimilation; it is more experiment that methodology, more Joycean that Cranian. This
requires a closer look.
Kincaid’s response is, of course, far from unfounded. Huxley’s Raven is a wondrously
odd text, the stated aim of which is to “solve”, via the warped logic of nonsense (which is
also detailed), the famous Carrollian riddle “Why is a raven like a writing desk?”, and in
order to (attempt to) do so a whole gamut of eccentric methodologies dressed up as
positivistic, truth-bearing models of enquiry are cast across Carroll’s texts, his teaching and
even his medical records. Alliterative connections, alpha-numeric codes, obscure
biographical information, metaphor, stuttering, geographical coincidences and textual
analyses are deployed in a maze of shifting and oftentimes absolutist criticism which is as
ingenious as it is madcap. And Huxley makes no bones about it. His text sets out from the
very start to “make capital” (7) out of Carroll’s semantic repository (a capitalising effort
mirrored in his transformation of “riddle” to “Riddle” and of “nonsense” to “Nonsense”), and
to do so using every available avenue of opportunity. There is a telling moment early on in
the Foreword where a question is posed concerning Carroll’s authorial intent (in relation to
figure of Arthurian legend, Gawain) in the poem “Phantasmagoria” (1876). Huxley asks and
answers: “But did Carroll know Gawain? Perhaps: perhaps not. Perhaps we are dealing with
a pun of another kind, namely a coincidence” (8). The conflation here of “perhaps” with
“perhaps not” by way of a colon, rather than a semi-colon, which would be more
grammatically accurate, works to conflate the textual effects of the pun—a purposeful
attempt by an author to draw in new contextual framings for words or phrases (“perhaps”)—
and the coincidence, which we could define as a chance correlation between one text and
another highlighted by an attentive reader (“perhaps not”). In placing these oppositional (or
conflicting) terms appositively Huxley flattens the distinction between the two and clears the
ground for a methodology where conjecture assumes the same truth-bearing status as
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“evidence”-based assertions. And this is not for nothing. In creating through this conflation
what we might call a Methodology of Nonsense, Huxley implies a certain value-judgement
on other forms of knowledge or epistemologies based on the logic of “perhaps”—that is, the
logic of assertions based on textual or experiment-based evidence. Since if it is possible to
converge the oppositions of accident and design in order to proffer a validated version of
conjecture, then it is equally possible (and in fact essential) that evidence-based knowledge
be shaded by the logic of guesswork—the conflation needs to work both ways. And
“evidence” for this can be found in what Huxley terms “Higher Nonsense”, a category which
encompasses fields like philosophy, logic and criticism (or any professionalised academic
discipline). He writes that academics within such disciplines are merely “converting what lies
on the other side of the reasonable limit [being the methodological limit imposed by
disciplinary or discursive rules] into their particular brand of Higher Nonsense” (10)—which
is to say, that all works of interpretation are equally liable to conflate the distinction between
“perhaps” and “perhaps not” in order to reach suitable conclusions. This mirrors somewhat
Kenneth Burke’s assertion that “[a]ll questions are leading questions” in that they work,
through their very posing, to “set the field of controversy” (Literary Form 67), and thereby
work to influence the answers one is likely to find in any given text. The only discernable
difference, then, returning to Kincaid’s review, between Huxleyesque Nonsense and R. S.
Crane’s “particular brand” of Higher Nonsense, is that the rhetorical tricks and twists in “The
Concept of Plot and the Plot of Tom Jones” are less easily visible than in Raven—a text
which proudly flaunts its own failings and then labels them as victories.
We find a similar dynamic expressed in Huxley’s elaboration of the logic of Nonsense
itself, which runs throughout the spine of the book in a series of mind-boggling “rules” (there
are twenty-two in total: 1–20, 42 and 42b) apparently working to define exactly how the
game of Nonsense can be played and the Riddle solved. Rules such as “[y]ou can come and
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go simultaneously, as long as there are two of you”, (35) “[t]he description of a circle does
not explain the point it is drawn from” (46), and “[t]o save your life, hide it in a portmanteau”
(70), are presented by Huxley as the edicts upon which to base an understanding of Nonsense
themes and motifs. The only problem with this, though, is that they are all drawn ad hoc from
either Huxley’s own analysis or Carroll’s texts themselves, and work thus merely to mirror
Huxley’s evolving argument rather than control it—as he himself writes: “[w]hat rules shall
we invent to account for this?” (35) As a result we occasionally find rules which have already
been broken, or rules which if fulfilled necessitate the breaking of previous rules; it is as if
they are lessons cast in iron slowly sinking in sand. We could of course account for this quite
simply if we decide that such circuitous and self-negating reasoning is merely the result of an
unsolvable riddle couched in an unsolvable genre—that, as it were, impossible tasks require
inconceivable methods, so it makes sense, in a sense, that there is no(n)sense. But if it is true,
as Kincaid writes, that what Raven leads us to see is that “both the riddle about the raven and
the writing desk and the riddle about the meaning of nonsense are unanswerable” (274), then
it does so in a way not limited to these somewhat parochial confines. Since in drawing a
connection between the logic of nonsense, Nonsense and Higher Nonsense, any comment
upon the methodological intricacy of one component in this chain necessarily infers certain
value-judgements on all the rest. So that in Huxley’s text, Nonsense becomes simply a more
ordered version of nonsense—“[t]here must be a limit [to Nonsense], of course, or Nonsense
would merely be nonsense.” (9)—and a less ordered version of Higher Nonsense (which
works harder to conceal or strengthen categorical or rule-based assertions through rhetoric
and framing). The inference of course being that all are engaged to greater or lesser degrees
in the game of rule-making and rule-breaking, just as all rules thereby produced arise from
within a certain discursive moment which is forever subject to fluctuation. It is we as readers
who are able through these methods to “make capital” out of texts by asking leading
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questions the answers to which we think we already know. Take, for example, this reading
here of Huxley. Did the author intend to use a colon rather than a semi-colon or a comma?
Perhaps: perhaps not. Was it just a typographical error missed by the author and editor?
Perhaps: perhaps not. Did Huxley really mean anything greater than to baffle his readership?
Perhaps: perhaps not. Everyone must read belatedly, and it is in this state of lateness that
coincidence can assume the lustre and surety of a pun if the reader desires it enough.
As should now be clearer, however, this convergence of chance coincidence and
engineered pun is not the antithesis to criticism (as Kincaid suggests) but rather its
hyperactive sibling—an excitable variant which works, through exacerbating existing traits
and foibles (not rejecting them), to other and alter literary criticism from within its own (now
stretched) domain. To distend de Certeau slightly, it is as if Huxley has stolen into the Secret
Garden of Criticism, rearranged the furniture, and sowed wild seeds of Nonsense in amongst
the neatly pared trees and rows of bedding plants; everything still grows from the same soil
and exists in the same space, only now the flowers grow beyond the confines of the trellis
fence, and the garden bench, which previously faced out imperiously over the landscape
beyond, now look back towards the interior of the House. And in this way Huxley’s Raven
operates as a demented work of external internalism, a frame-stretching text which moves
beyond criticism through criticism, between repulsion and assimilation, in order to apprise us
of a truth which remains invisible from the inside looking out.

~ The Joycean portmanteau-word ~
But then as limit texts go, Huxley’s Raven, despite its ingenuity and wit, is largely
unheralded and unknown. And in fact it only appears in this discussion because of an isolated
footnote, referencing this neglect, in a chapter on Finnegans Wake in Derek Attridge’s book
Peculiar Language, where the author surmises (somewhat ironically, given that this is the
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one reference to Huxley in a 250-page book) that, like Joyce’s last text, The Raven and the
Writing Desk “is equally likely to be overlooked by the literary establishment” (198). As
already discussed, the catalyst for Huxley’s rejection lies largely in his eccentric,
hypercritical (and therefore seemingly uncritical) methodology which works to stretch the
category of criticism, through criticism, to near unrecognisability (and back again). And it is
the same sort of logic that pervades Attridge’s analysis of Wakean abandonment criticism,
only with one important addendum, which is the centrality of the portmanteau-word within
his methodology. And it is easy to see why this is the case.
Joyce employs the portmanteau-word with such frequency within his text that, to
borrow from Ruben Borg, it “comes to typify the Wake’s linguistic inventiveness at large”
(“Neologizing” 143). Even within the opening sentence of the text—“riverrun, past Eve and
Adam’s, from swerve of shore to bend of bay, brings us by a commodious vicus of
recirculation back to Howth Castle and Environs.” (Joyce 3)—it is possible to discern
“riverrun”, “commodious” and “vicus” as potential candidates, although given the multilingual nature of the text there is little point counting such things; nearly any word could
qualify under the right scrutiny, as Derrida skilfully demonstrates in his essay “Two words
for Joyce” (152-7). Whatever the case though—and of course such ambiguity over word
classification, or even parts of speech, is a hallmark of the Wake’s style—the prominence of
the portmanteau-word in Joyce’s text works to destabilise meaning in a profound way, setting
in motion a cyclical chain of signification which runs without stopping.
Attridge’s analysis of the Wake begins by highlighting exactly this process in relation
to the more pedestrian rhetorical feature of the pun, arguing that whilst the pun ably
demonstrates the fluid nature of meaning, it does so in a controlled environment which works
to limit (through contextualisation) the number of possible outcomes, and thereby reinforces
the relationship between reader and writer, who are both “in” on the joke (the Huxleyesque
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“perhaps”). By comparison the portmanteau-word has “the effect of a failed pun” (Attridge
201), since that comfortable pact between reader and writer is replaced by an unnerving
residue (or excess) which calls into question both authorial intention and interpretive agency
(“perhaps not”). This is not to say that the portmanteau-word exists beyond contextualised
disambiguation, but more that it momentarily suspends ordinary protocols by making such a
process immediately apparent, thus demanding from the interpreter a productive act of
reading through which different levels of sense are sought to be sorted. And in a text like the
Wake, where the contextual framework for a portmanteau-word may well consist of yet more
portmanteau-words, it is easy to see how such a process, once started, disappears over the
horizon of time and space. By way of example, Attridge offers a close-reading of the signifier
“shuit”, and from a relatively modest start, where the contextual adjective “buckly” infers
possibilities like “shirt”, “shoes” and “suit”, the consideration of a further contextualising
signifier, “Rosensharonals”—which, incidentally, works in the context of the book to
transform the adjective “buckly” into an Irish soldier “Buckley”—extends the list of possible
component words to five, with “shoot” and “shit” added to the list. Deciding, then, what
exists and where in a given Wakean portmanteau-word becomes an exercise in active
detection (or even production). And this from only a limited investigation into a single
signifier. The truth, as Attridge points out, is that there is “no reference book […] to tell us all
the possible signifiers that are or could be associated in sound with ‘shuit’, and we have
learned no method of interpretation to tell us how to go about finding those signifiers” (202).
And this move beyond traditional hermeneutic protocols is key, since what it presents
is a text of such complexity that it ceases to enact a normative reader–text relationship. It
breaks with formal or systematic comprehension of themes, plot, character, etc., throws each
and every signifier into doubt, and makes plain, as Attridge writes, “that meaning is an effect
of language, not a presence within or behind it, and that the effect is unstable and
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uncontrollable” (197). What this breach of normativity induces critically is akin to Kincaid’s
review of Raven: that is, a choice between isolating the text as aberrant and unknowable (and
thereby rejecting it), and gathering up the text using existing (if incompatible) interpretive
methods; it can either be cordoned off and guarded by its own formidable reputation, or it can
be dissected using rusty instruments. Of the two approaches, Attridge favours the former over
the latter since it at least recognises, through rejection, the explicit difference of the Wake and
the challenge it poses in terms of existing method- or terminologies—a recognition of course
absent in the belief that such method- or terminologies will suffice. It is better to be “afraid of
Finnegans Wake” (188), Attridge tells us, than to treat it just like any other text, because it is
only through apprehending it as unerringly other that its difference, as well as the affectivity
stemming from such difference, can be maintained and cultivated. It is preferable to be
fearful (and neglectful) than overbearing (and assimilative).
Even better still, however, is to be neither and both simultaneously. And this is where
Attridge’s analysis draws most lucratively from the logic of the portmanteau-word and its
centrality in Joyce’s text. Such a logic should by now be familiar. It is that movement beyond
language through language that cleaves open an unknowable semantic space (in the area
beyond sense) which both invites, through excess, and functionally negates, through excess,
elements of control which seek to delimit its contents—a process which remains ongoing (or
at least open to change) in perpetuity, although in different (and very often diminishing)
degrees. Attridge’s navigation of the gap between rejection and assimilation operates in a
similarly contingent and ongoing way. Since despite apparent intimations to the contrary,
Attridge does not view the Wake as some alien text beyond all semblance of sense, but rather
as a work which differs from other literature “in degree, not in kind” (203); in other words, it
takes literature, through literature, beyond itself, but it does not and cannot break free from its
common ancestry. The fear-inducing difference of the Wake is palpable, observable and real,
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but it is not total (it still comes from something), just as the seemingly interpretable
components of the Wake, like the signifier “shuit”, are touched by an elemental difference
which begins processes of comprehension without a knowable end. Excess is tempered by
structure and structure eroded through excess.
To read the Wake is thus to engage in a process of negotiation between these dialogic
and opposing forces, where difference, excess and rejection must be met (and intermingled)
with normativity, structure and assimilation. And it is the reader who is charged to makes
these calls, the reader who must decide where signification coalesces and where it dissipates,
where themes emerge and characters develop. It is the reader who must track a path, tell a
story, and make the semantic lack of the portmanteau-word (logic) speak. But it is also the
reader who is charged with the failure of these decisions, the reader who must face up to the
inevitable nonfulfillment of the interpretive act, and the reader who is made to understand
that new meanings, new angles and new (re)articulations are always possible. Umberto Eco
encompasses this nicely in The Aesthetics of the Chaosmos, where he actually sets about
creating a visual network of signifiers (associated with the Wakean portmanteau-word
“meandertale”) in an attempt to discern a potential reading from their interrelationships. A
total of forty-three possible connections (both phonemes and lexemes) are produced, and
from this list a verifiable reading of the signifier can be plotted. But this would only be one
among various paths and patterns of association, and it would have to be based on
assumptions concerning the configuration and sequence of the network’s component parts,
when in actuality, “by the laws of phonetic and semantic similarity, each lexeme can become
the ‘patriarch’ of a series of associations, each of these composed by a list of lexemes, each
of which can become, in turn, the patriarch of other associative chains” (Eco 69). There is, in
other words, no way to establish the correct order of things hierarchically: “every word of the
book becomes the main issue that introduces every other word […] everything is both deep
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‘inside’ and peripheral ‘outside’” (70). And this of course is only one network among many,
with each network itself made up of “cultural associations” (69) which are time and space
specific, so that even without the turbulence created by additional readers bringing their own
culturally determined thoughts to the table, each re-reading by the same reader will be
affected by both their temporal and spatial coordinates, as well as their previous reflections
on the work. The upshot of this being, as a reader progresses through the text, selecting
patriarchal terms, digressions and hierarchies along the way, that every act of interpretation
(within the same reading or not) has the potential to reorganise the manifold networks of
association hitherto set in place, so that, as Eco writes, “[t]he manner in which we understand
a term totally changes the way in which we understand the term in the preceding pages” (75).
This closed causal chain, where A can lead to B, but B can change how we read A, means
that, mirroring the circularity of the book itself—where the first sentence is the second half of
the final sentence—each interpretive moment sets in motion a semantic current which
rebounds indefinitely across and within the text’s 600 pages.
Eco’s analysis, in fact, is predicated on such a spiralling circularity, with Viconian
corsi and ricorsi (turn and return), de Cusa’s coincidenta oppositorium (coincidence of
opposites) and Brunonian (and de Cusa’s) complicatio (everything in each thing) combining
to create a Wakean universe in which newness and creativity can only emerge from a
condensation and (re)articulation of what has come before. There is a helical twist whereby
each moment bears the palimpsestic history of what has preceded it, and a causal web which
sees every moment of the helix as both patriarch and antecedent to every other moment in the
chain. Under such scrutiny the Wake assumes, according to Eco, an isotropic (i.e. flat)
appearance, where no element is either progressive or digressive, and a homogenous density,
where, since the same connections can be made from any synecdochic point in the text, it
looks the same from whichever angle you choose to approach it from. The emergence of
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newness thus comes from a reordering of this existing (and spiralling) constellation of
“space-time event” signifiers whose relation with other signifiers changes according to “the
position of the observer and the decisions that the observer makes when semantically
provoked by each term” (72)—a process (of reading) carried out by Eco himself through his
zeroing in on Wakean references to philosophy from the Middle Ages and then constructing
an argument around them. What we have here, in fact, in critical terms, is something akin to
de Certeau’s reworking of the Greek term metis—that injection of experience where “in the
initial configuration of space (I), the world of the memory (II) intervenes at the ‘right
moment’ [kairos] (III) and produces modifications of the space (IV)” (de Certeau 84). Eco’s
knowledge of Vico and Bruno emerges from the world of memory to transform isotropy and
homogeneity into a textured argument of scope and depth; the fragment impacts on the body,
the spiralling past intercedes in the present.
For de Certeau, of course, this archive of memory operates as a constantly renewing
source of tactical agency in the overdetermined world of strategy—metis, like walking in the
city, like reading as poaching, like difference in heterologies, undercuts or steals something
away from the categories in which it resides. It is an everyday operation of daily life,
implicated in and informed by the official organisation of space, which has the power to
(incrementally) surprise, via the fragment, the official organisation of that space—as de
Certeau writes: “[f]ar from being the reliquary or trash can of the past, [memory] sustains
itself by believing in the existence of possibilities and by vigilantly awaiting them, constantly
on the watch for their appearance” (87).
With the Wake, though, as Eco and Attridge’s analyses have already shown, these
opportunities for acts of metis or memory—points where the reader is able to reorganise the
space of signification—are ubiquitous and encouraged. It is the only way, in fact, to make
progress through (or impose order upon) the text: networked routes informed by memory and
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context are a prerequisite of reading, and without them there would be no coalescent themes
or characters upon which to build a narrative, no phosphorescent flares to mark a route
through the oneiric darkness. And this of course poses an important question concerning how
situated and politicised theories of contingent personal agency, like those of de Certeau and
Laclau, be usefully applied to the Wakean universe, which from the very first page actually
relinquishes control of signification to the reader. To borrow again from de Certeau’s
metaphor from “Reading as Poaching”, how can there be any tension between the
institutional landowners and the wandering nomads when the Wake ensures that everyone is
equally bereft of landed property, and that all are welcome to stalk its public hunting grounds
(albeit grounds populated only with animals which run faster than speeding bullets)? <5>
In order to help answer such a question it is useful to return once more to Huxley’s
Raven—a text which, like the Wake, operates on the liminal border between difference and
sameness, rejection and assimilation. Since in the same way that Huxley’s frame-stretching
text connects up nonsense, Nonsense and Higher Nonsense through operating in a mode of
contained hypercriticism which, on the surface, bears no resemblance to traditional Schools,
but in fact works to test and query such “official” methodologies, so Joyce’s Finnegans Wake
proffers a kind of hypernovel which, through stretching the novel’s capabilities without
breaking the frame, works to reflect back onto the extant and majoritarian tradition of novelwriting by presenting a much exaggerated (but connected) version of its methods and
rhetoric. The result being that, as in Raven, a comment upon the Wake’s delirious processes
of signification—i.e. “the text can be made to mean anything by the reader”—has an impact
upon more “ordinary” modes of discourse further down the chain, which, in varying degrees,
fall under the same open-ended logic. The Wake thus represents a less ordered version of the
normative novel, which in turn represents a less ordered version of, say, scientific discourse
or legalese, but all are contiguous and all are structured in differing degrees according to the
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principles of signification in Joyce’s frame-stretching text. In de Certeauian terms, then, what
the comprehensive and required act of metis in the Wake demonstrates is the inherent
narrativity (and therefore changeability) of all discourse, whether it be Wakean or otherwise.
As de Certeau himself writes, “one fact is indicative. The ways of operating do not merely
designate activities that a theory might take as its objects. They also organise its
construction.” (77) There can never be a separation of theory from practice: to write is to
narrate, and to narrate to both utilise and become subject to an art of metis which forever
vitalises (contingent) tactical agency in the face of strategical overdetemination. To
paraphrase Derek Attridge’s oxymoronic formulation of the “controlled explosion”, we are
able via the Wake to glimpse the infinitude of meaning held in abeyance by the interpretive
and strategical grids which (we use to) guide our actions, whilst simultaneously
understanding that such grids are themselves discursively constructed and are therefore open
to change and fluctuation (208). It is exactly this logic behind Laclau’s somewhat cryptic idea
that “power is the very condition of emancipation” (293). Control and excess (or hegemony
and the decision-making subject) are necessary if oxymoronic bedmates: we impose and are
imposed upon; we exceed and are forever exceeded. All that are then left are fragments of
sense caught in the crossfire upon which to erect, on “undecidable terrain”, new and tumbling
forms of knowledge and understanding.
And once again, it is the portmanteau-word which can be seen to provide the locus
and vehicle for such theorisations, since it is the portmanteau-word which condenses this
logic into its most compacted form. Consisting of fragments and endowed with an
unknowable semantic space which both invites and negates control, the portmanteau-word
exceeds the frame of language so that what is obfuscated from within (i.e. the inherently
unstable and contextual nature of signification; the transformative power of the fragment; the
acausal relationship between control and excess) might be revealed from the sort of external
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internalism of which the portmanteau-word (and Huxley’s Raven, and the Wake) specialises.
The portmanteau-word is both an agent for such revelatory change in its necessary movement
beyond the frame of language, and emblematic of the potential for further frame-stretching
endeavour through its insistence that all discourse is equally susceptible to the transformative
power of the grasped fragment. Indeed, built into the very DNA of the portmanteau-word
itself, trapped within its very processes of signification, is an absolute declaration that frames
are made to be broken—in fact that they are built broken—and that once this is
acknowledged, the teeming surpluses of language, politics and everyday life might be
accessed imaginatively, progressively and, of course, contingently, so as to enact change
where change seemed impossible.
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Notes

<1> The New Oxford English Dictionary was published between 1884 and 1928. Volume 7
was published in 1909.

<2> “Portmanteau biota” is a term coined by Alfred W. Crosby in Ecological Imperialism:
The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900 (1986), and refers to the animals, seeds and
microbes transported to foreign lands during the height of European imperialism and colonial
expansion. “Portmanteau drugs” refers to a combination or cocktail of different medications.
“Portmanteau cinema” refers to a film made up of multiple clips.

<3> Here, of course, we still have the incorrect word choice, since to refute something is to
prove it wrong or false, whereas to repudiate something is to refuse to accept or be associated
with it, which is presumably Palin’s hortatory message concerning the then-proposed Ground
Zero Mosque.

<4> It will be noted that Palin uses the letters “f” and “d” when she in fact means “f” and
“p”, and also that the letters “f” and “p” are conspicuously separated on a traditional
QWERTY keyboard.

<5> Admittedly it could also be argued that the complexity of Finnegans Wake precludes
anything other than an institutional endeavour, but as de Certeau says in Practice, “[i]t is
always good to remind ourselves that we mustn’t take people for fools.” (p. 176)
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